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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LOISCROWDER,

*

)

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

]
]

vs.

]

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
a body politic,

]
]I

Defendant and
Appellant,

Case No. 14405

.]
]

and JOHN DOES I
through X,

• ]

Defendants.

]

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against appellant for personal injury to
respondent resulting from an autanobile accident occurring in Salt
Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss respondent's Complaint
on the ground that respondent failed to file a notice of claim with
appellant within the ninety days provided for in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 (1967)). The respondent
filed an Amended Con plaint in which she admitted that notice was
not given the appellant county within the time provided, but in so amending,
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claimed that the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act are unconstitutional as they do not afford due process and equal
protection of the law.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and issued a
Memorandum Decision declaring that the ninety day notice r e q u i r e ment violates equal protection and due process of law, and is unconstitutional.

>

<

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's Order
denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts as set forth in

^

appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

'

THERE EXISTS NO RATIONAL OR REASONABLE BASIS FOR DIFFERING NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS AS IMPOSED BY UTAH
STATUTES INVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES.
• • *

The State of Utah has waived its sovereign immunity to allow
actions against it and its political subdivisions for torts committed
by the state, counties, municipalities and governmental entities against

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the citizens of this State. In so doing, the State has established
varying times within which notice of a claim must be filed against
the State of Utah, a political subdivision, a city or incorporated town.
Absent filing of such claim within the time specified, actions against
the State, its political subdivisions, cities and towns are barred.
The notice provisions require that claims must be filed
against the State of Utah within one year after the cause of action
arises. * Claims against other governmental entities, including
counties, must be filed within 90 days after the cause of action arises,
and claims against cities and incorporated towns must be filed within six months.

1.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1967): A claim against the state or
any agency thereof as defined herein shall be forever barred
unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney general of the
State of Utah and the agency concerned within one year after
the cause of action arises.

2.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13(1967): A claim against a political
subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is
filed within ninety days after the cause of action a r i s e s . . .

3.

Utah Code Ann. §10-7-77 (1967): Every claim against a city
or incorporation town for damages or injury, alleged to have
been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed
condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert
or bridge of such city or town, or from the negligence of
the city or town authorities in respect to any such street,
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within
six months after the happening of such injury or damage be
presented to the board of commissioners or city council of
such city, or board of trustees of such town, . . .
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In the event such claims are rejected, legal action must be initiated
within one year after notification of the rejection or presumed denial
by inaction on the part of the governmental entity.
Fundamental to the basic issue in this case is a determination of the existence of an appropriate governmental interest suitably

<

furthered by the differential treatment and differing notice requirement as imposed by existing State statutes. Absent a showing of the
i

existence of such overriding governmental interest, the legislation
must be striken as a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,
406 U.S. 164(1972).
Although discrimination between classes of citizens has
been upheld as not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, such legislation has only been upheld
where the classification has been deemed to be reasonable and have
some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.
Respondent asserts that the classifications and differences
existing in the Utah notice statutes are wholly irrelevant to the purpose
of the statutes and legislative objective in waiving governmental immunities in certain instances, and that there exists no reasonable
justification for such differing notice periods.
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The Utah statutes waiving sovereign immunity of the State,
its political subdivisions, incorporated towns and cities, is a law of
general application throughout the State of Utah and is a matter of
State-wide interest and concern. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
It is apparent that the differing notice requirements as provided in
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12, §63-30-13 and §10-7-77 are not unifoim
in their operation.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution forbids any state to "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " As stated in Toronto v.
Sheffield, 118 Utah 460.222 Pac. 2d 594 (1950):
f

Under these provisions in State v. Mason,
94 Utah 501, at page 507, and 78 P. 2d 920,
at page 923 and 117 A. L. R. 330 through
Mr. Justice Wolfe, we said: "Of course,
every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The Legislature cannot [in
one act] legislate as to all persons or all
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some
class or group and as to some human relationships, transactions or functions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary.
A classification is never unreasonable or
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
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features so long as there is some basis for
the differentiation between classes or sub- .
ject matters included as compared to those
excluded from its operation, provided the
differentiation bears a reasonable relation
to the purposes to be accomplished by the
act."
To the same effect see Gronlund v.
Salt Lake City, Utah, 194 P. 2d 464;
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140
P. 2d 939; State v. Walker, 100 Utah 523,
116 P.2d 766; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah
318, 71 P. 482, 60 L.R.A. 468, 95 Am.
St. Rep. 845.

,

*

222 Pac. 2d at 599.
i

Appellant argues that these differentiations between classes and subject matters mentioned above are founded in the beneficial effect of
giving governmental entities an opportunity to settle meritous claims
prior to the institution of litigation; that they provide an opportunity

i

to investigate the claims at the earliest opportunity; and further,
I
that they allow the entity to anticipate, in a fiscal sense, the payment
of claims along with granting an opportunity to make proper repairs
of dangerous defects. The appellant further argues that the notice
statutes give the added benefit of facilitating the orderly and
expedious administration of public business. The respondent, on
the other hand, argues to this Court that the interests of the State
of Utah, with a substantially longer notice period, are as direct and
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immediate in avoiding needless litigation; are as involved with a
prompt investigation of claims; and find it as desirable fiscally and
from the standpoint of the elemination of defects as those interests
of the county government. It may well be said that all governmental
entities share equally in these stated goals. However, by virtue of
the fact that the respondent herein collided with a bridge owned by
Salt Lake County, the applicable notice period is dramatically less
than would have obtained had she collided with a bridge owned by
Salt Lake City (six months) or the State of Utah (one year).
The appellant suggests that a shorter notice of claim period
is required by Salt Lake County than is required by the State or a
municipality since there may be no other way for city or county
personnel promptly to discover and correct defective conditions.
Respondent, however, suggests that the investigative ability of
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office in connection with automobile
accidents and the activities of insurance investigators of the liability,
insurance carrier of Salt Lake County adequately enables appellant
conveniently and promptly to become aware of potential claims
involving appellant county and to transmit to appropriate county
departments the existence of any unsafe or defective road or highway conditions, bridges, etc. In reality, appellant is better prepared
and equipped to investigate and defend negligence actions than are
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most private tortfeasors to whom no special notice privilege has been
granted by the Legislature. Grubaugh v. St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165,
180 N. W. 2d 778, 44 A. R.L. 3d 1095 (1970). That appellant's need
for a shorter notice period than that of the State of Utah or an incorporated town or city is not apparent from the notice statutes. Appellant
assumes a legislative purpose and history not evident from the record
of this case in its suggestions at pages 8-12 of appellant's brief that
the Legislature took into account certain facts regarding geographical
and population differences, differences in services, differences in
budgeting and revenues and manpower, which facts are not in evidence
in this case or part of the record hereof.
The Nevada Supreme Court, in striking down the Nevada
Revised Statutes requiring the filing of a notice of claim in a period
shorter than the general statutes of limitation, stated in the case of
Turnery. Staggs, 89 Nev, 230, 510 P. 2d 879 (1973); cert, den. 414
U.S. 1079(1973):
n

[W]e believe that the notice of claim
requirements found in NRS 244.245 and
NRS 244.250 as applied to governmental
torts deny equal protection guaranteed
by the United States Constitution. Within our present scheme of government,
claim statutes serve no real beneficial
use . . .but they are indeed a trap for
the unwary. ,f
Likewise, respondent urges that these diversified claim requirements
vis-a-vis city, county and State are not founded on a reasonable classification. The result of such legislation has been, indeed, to trap
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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this unwary respondent and, if the appellant prevails, deny to her
the availability of our courts.
Respondent suggests that in the interest of uniform application of the law, that the notice requirements applicable to all governmental entities be standardized and given a general application throughout the State regardless of the type of governmental entity or political
subdivision involved. The existing differences

have no apparent

relationship to any demonstrable legislative purpose.

Respondent

suggests that the notice requirement as applied to counties should
be at least the minimum six month requirement imposed on incorporated towns and cities. To the extent that appellant's argument concerning geographical distance and area has any m e r i t in comparison of
cities, towns, counties and the State, respondent suggests it would
be more reasonable to provide a longer notice requirement applicable
to counties and a shorter notice requirement to cities and towns.
See generally, F a r r e l l , Delay in Notice of Tort Claims Against a
Governmental Agency, 20 Cleveland State Law Review 23 (1971).
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE IN
REVIEW OF IMPUGNED LEGISLATION
AND DECLARE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-13 TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

-9-
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This Court has the power to declare any act of any department of government violative of the Federal or State constitutions to
be utterly void, and in exercising this function in regard to an act
of the Legislature it does not trench on the domain of the legislative
branch of government. Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 Pac. 670
(1896).
Effective use of the court system of this State should not be
needlessly complex. Rather, a simple basis for allowing a victim
of governmental tort access to our courts should be the standard.
Inconsistencies existing among statutes involving notice requirements
should be resolved in favor of the injured citizen to allow plaintifflitigants maximum free access to our courts. This is consistent
with our constitutional mandates and legislative history.
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
"All courts shall be open and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause
to which he is a party."
Notwithstanding the above-cited State Constitutional provision, the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
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United States prohibits the State from making or enforcing any law
"which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. tT
The notice of claim statutes operate in reality as a statute
of limitations. Albert v. Deitz 283 Fed. Supp. 854 (D.Haw. 1968).
Yet public policy expressed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
is clearly in favor of allowing recovery to persons of this State
injured by governmental tortfeasors.
To uphold the validity of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 would
effectively deprive respondent of her day in court, denying her
access to the judicial system, which access historically has been
equated to the "inalienable rights recognized by the United States
Supreme CourtM. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-80,
28 L.Ed. 2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780(1971).
It has been stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Aim strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 35 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.
2d 62, 66(1965):
fT

[T]he right to a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. . .must be protected against
denial by particular laws that operate to
jeopardize it for particular individuals. ,f

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The State of Utah cannot deny the plaintiff a reasonable
opportunity to litigate plaintiff's action and prevent her access to
the courts. It follows such access cannot be unreasonably constrained
for a particular class of persons without violating the Equal
Protection Clause, The so-called notice requirements have become
traps for the unwary and exhibit no justification in the furtherance
of any legitimate governmental or legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION
The differing notice requirements lack the constitutionally
required standard of a rational classification and reasonable basis
of legislative purpose. Further, they appear to be nothing more
than an arbitrary exercise of legislative drafting in pursuit of no
apparent legislative purpose, and certainly not the legitimate
purposes required by the Federal and State constitutions. The
thrust of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is to ameliorate the
hardship caused by the now generally repudiated doctrine of "the
king can do no wrong."
By affirming the trial court's finding of the unconstitutionality
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13, this Court could further the purpose
and spirit of the Utah Governmental Immunities Act and give to that
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legislation the general application of the laws required by our
State constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
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